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BLINDED BY BIOTERRORISM:
PUBLIC HEALTH AND LIBERTY IN THE
2 1 ST CENTURY
George J. Annast
Ah yes, the quarantine, it didn't do any good.
Jos Saramago, Blindness
In Blindness, Nobel Prize laureate Jos6 Saramago chronicles the
quarantining of the first victims of a plague of blindness.1 We meet
many people who become blind in Saramago's novel, including an
opthamologist, a one-eyed man with an eye patch, and a man born
blind. Saramago reminds us that we are all blind in one way or an-
other, and that there are many things about ourselves and our society
that we can't or won't see. The quarantine itself turns out to be isolat-
ing, inhumane, and degrading; the interred blind being portrayed by
themselves and others as pigs, dogs, and "lame crabs." Soldiers stand
guard, and shoot anyone trying to escape, mostly out of fear that they
themselves might become infected by the blindness virus.
Of course many Americans were temporarily blinded on Septem-
ber 11 by the smoke and debris in the terror attacks on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon. And even after the smoke cleared,
fear and anger fueled a desire for revenge and a quest for security.
The security quest seemed even more urgent following the anthrax
attacks through the mail. Fear generated responses that in retrospect
appear overzealous, potentially counterproductive, and unnecessarily
destructive of human rights. This is easier to see after almost two
years have elapsed since 9/11, especially in the area of bioterrorism.
t George J. Annas is the Edward R. Utley Professor and Chair of the Health
Law Department, Boston University School of Public Health, Professor of Socio-
Medical Sciences and Community Medicine, Boston University School of Medicine,
Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law, and cofounder of Global Law-
yers and Physicians. A.B., Harvard College (1967); J.D., Harvard Law School
(1970); M.P.H., Harvard School of Public Health (1972). Copyright 2003 by George
J. Annas.
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In this article I examine two specific public health responses to
9/11, the treatment of those exposed in the anthrax by mail attacks,
and the proposal for new state antibioterrorism legislation. I suggest
that our "new kind of war" on terror requires us to abandon our 19th
century vision of public health as essentially a coercion-based state
and local activity, and to accept the fact that in the 21st century public
health is properly and primarily a national and international activity
that should be based on human rights. It is simply not true that we
must always sacrifice individual rights and liberty to take effective
public health action against contagious diseases: modem public
health measures must put human rights first to be effective. Finally, I
will briefly examine the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)
epidemic of 2003 and the attempt to vaccinate some health care pro-
viders against smallpox as of way of testing the reasonableness of the
conclusions drawn from our experiences with anthrax and state anti-
bioterrorism legislation as they relate to modem public health.
I. THE ANTHRAX ATTACKS
In emergency situations, including war, bioterrorism, and epidem-
ics, all sorts of decisions may be made and justified in a free society
that would in normal circumstances be seen as repulsive and contrary
to the constitutional foundations of the society itself. Immediately
after September 11, for example, the civil liberties of suspected terror-
ists were suspended, secret military tribunals were proposed to try
terrorists, and torture was proposed to obtain information from terror-
ists. 2 Although we have a tendency to opt for safety over liberty, this
is often a false choice that produces neither. 3 In this regard the public
health reaction to America's first major bioterrorist attack involving
2 See, e.g., President Bush's Order on the Trial of Terrorists by Military
Commission, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2001, at B8 (authorizing secretive military tribu-
nals); Elisabeth Bumiller & David Johnston, Bush Sets Option of Military Trials in
Terrorist Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2001, at Al (indicating the creation of military
tribunals & the loss of rights); Robin Toner, Civil Liberty vs. Security: Finding a
Wartime Balance, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2001, at Al (discussing reduced civil liberties
and the creation of military tribunals as a result of the September 11, 2001 attacks);
Alan M. Dershowitz, Yes, It Should be "On the Books," BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 16,
2002, at Al 5 (expressing his opinion against torture without legislative and judicial
approval); Jeffrey Rosen, The Difficult Balance Between Liberty and Security, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 6, 2002, § 4 (Late Edition), at 13 (discussing the constitutionality of laws
enacted after September 11, 2001 that allow investigation of all Americans).
3 See, e.g., BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, AN HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE
CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA (1759) (containing the oft-
quoted statement: "Those who exchange liberty for security deserve neither").
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multiple locations in the United States, which used anthrax delivered
through the mail, holds lessons for emergencies.4
Twenty-two people developed anthrax (about half inhalation and
half cutaneous) from the attacks, and five died.5 More than 10,000
people were advised to take antibiotics on the presumption that they
were at risk for inhalation anthrax.6 In late December, the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA), the Department of Defense (DOD), and
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) together re-
leased the anthrax vaccine, previously only available to the military,
and approved by the FDA only to prevent cutaneous anthrax, for use
by those exposed to anthrax in the attacks.7 Of the 10,000 people
eligible to take the vaccine, only 152 did.8 In the face of continuing
high anxiety about the possible health effects of anthrax exposure, this
less than 2 percent positive response to the federal government's invi-
tation to take the vaccine is extraordinary. CDC officials wanted to
know why so few chose to take the vaccine, but reportedly decided
not to survey them to find out why they refused to consent to take this
investigational vaccine because the survey itself would have necessi-
tated obtaining consent.
9
We can take some comfort in the small number of casualties in
the anthrax attacks. Nonetheless, the anthrax bioterrorist was ex-
tremely effective in meeting his or her goal: not mass killing (the goal
in biowarfare), but terrorizing the civilian population. Since we can-
not be sure that similar attacks will not occur in the future, it is impor-
4 Julie Louise Gerberding et al., Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response:




7 See Thomas V. Inglesby et. al., Anthrax as a Biological Weapon, 2002:
Updated Recommendations for Management, 287 JAMA 2236, 2243-44 (2002) (dis-
cussing the history, benefits, and limitations of the anthrax vaccine).
8 See Steve Twomey, Vaccine Offer Draws Few Postal Workers, WASH.
POST, Dec. 28, 2001, at A6 (detailing the limited acceptance of the vaccine offer); see
also Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Civilians Are Reluctant to Join U.S. Test of Anthrax Vac-
cine, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2002 at A13 (confirming that less than two percent of the
10,000 workers received the vaccine); Gerberding et al., supra note 4 at 899.
9 See Stolberg, supra note 8 (noting the irony of a consent requirement for a
survey of why individuals chose not to receive the vaccine). See also Lawrence
Altman & Gina Kolata, Anthrax Missteps Offer Guide to Fight Next Bioterror Battle,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2002, at Al (suggesting the steps to be taken in the event of an-
other bioterror attack). It was later learned that only 44% of those exposed who were
told to take antibiotics for 60 days actually did. Approximately 13% took no medica-
tion at all. Lawrence K. Altman, Many Workers Ignored Anthrax Pill Regimen, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 30, 2002, at Al8.
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tant to understand the belated response of the federal government in
making the anthrax vaccine available, and why the public rejected its
use, in order to be better prepared for the next bioterrorist attack or
similar public health emergency. The basic rules regarding the use of
investigational drugs in biowarfare, and arguably in bioterrorism, go
back to the 1991 Gulf War.
II. INVESTIGATIONAL DRUGS IN WAR AND BIOWAR
Just prior to the Gulf War, the Pentagon sought an FDA waiver of
informed consent requirements for the use of specific investigational
drugs and vaccines on U.S. troops in the Gulf.' Informed consent is,
of course, required for all human experiments, including the use of
investigational drugs and vaccines. Specifically, the DOD sought
waivers of informed consent under FDA rules so DOD could use an
investigational drug (pyridostigmine bromide to be used as a pre-
treatment against an attack by the nerve gas soman), and an investiga-
tional vaccine (botulinum toxoid, a protective against clostridium
botulinum) without obtaining informed consent from the soldiers."l
There is provision in the FDA regulations for waiver of informed
consent when consent is not "feasible," but this exception had never
before been applied to competent adults. The basis of the DOD
waiver request was that informed consent was not feasible because the
military mission could be compromised if individual soldiers could
opt out of taking these agents.' 2 The FDA adopted a new regulation
permitting waiver of consent for military operations, and approved the
requested waivers under the provisions of the new regulation. 3 The
FDA did, however, require the military to make information sheets on
the agents available to the troops, and to collect, review and report on
adverse experiences. 14
Because it was an approved drug, the military use of pyridostig-
mine bromide as a "pretreatment" for a gas attack could have alterna-
tively been justified as use of an approved drug for an unapproved
indication based on the argument that it was a safe drug, even if not
10 For a more detailed discussion of the Gulf War waiver, see George J.
Annas, Protecting Soldiers from Friendly Fire: The Consent Requirement for Using
Investigational Drugs and Vaccines in Combat, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 245 (1998).
Id. at 247.
12 21 C.F.R. § 50.23 (1999).
13 id.
14 Human Drugs and Biologics; Determination that Informed Consent is
NOT Feasible or is Contrary to the Best Interests of Recipients; Revocation of 1990
Interim Final Rule; Establishment of New Interim Final Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 54,180,
54,184 et. seq. (Oct. 5, 1999).
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proven effective for this particular use. 15  Moreover, the military
command ultimately decided to make botulinum toxoid vaccination
voluntary. 16  Nonetheless, the FDA's 1990 waiver-of-consent rule
itself cannot be justified on the facts. Obtaining consent was feasible
in the field, and failure to obtain it in the case of investigational drugs
and vaccines is a direct violation of the consent requirements of the
Nuremberg Code that the military had adopted as their own in 1953."
The FDA policy also turned out to be counterproductive and danger-
ous. It led to a situation in which the troops were put in much more
jeopardy by taking pyridostigmine bromide than they would have
been by not taking it. This is because while the drug may protect
against soman, the agent US intelligence thought Iraq had, the nerve
gas the Iraqis were actually prepared to use was sarin - and pyri-
dostigmine can make sarin more deadly to humans. 18
Although the FDA and DOD defended their waiver of consent ac-
tions after the Gulf War, almost no one else did. Ultimately, Congress
passed a law that repealed the FDA's military combat exception to
informed consent, and put sole power to grant any future wartime
exception to informed consent in the hands of the president. 9 The
new law provides that only the president can authorize the military to
use an unapproved or investigational drug or vaccine in wartime with-
out consent, and to do so the president must find, in writing, that ob-
taining consent is not feasible, is contrary to the best interests of the
military, or is not in the interests of national security.20 The FDA has
also adopted regulations to help the president and his advisers make
this decision.2 '
A more basic question regarding drugs and vaccines designed for
emergency use in events like biowarfare and bioterrorism remains,
however: Assuming that it is impossible to ethically test the efficacy
15 Annas, supra note 10, at 250. The use of other drugs during the first Gulf
War was apparently justified on this basis.
16 Supra note 14.
17 C.E. WILSON, MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY,
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE (Feb. 26, 1953), reprinted in
THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN
EXPERIMENTATION, 343-45 (George J. Annas & Michael A. Grodin eds., Oxford
Univ. Press, 1992).
18 Robert W. Haley & Thomas L. Kurt, Self-reported Exposure to Neurotoxic
Chemical Combinations in the Gulf War, 277 JAMA 231, 232 (1997); I Koplovitz et
al., Reduction by Pyridostigmine Pretreatment of the Efficacy ofAtropine and 2-PAM
Treatment of Sarin and VX Poisoning in Rodents, 18 FUNDAMENTAL & APPLIED
TOXICOLOGY 102, 103-105 (1992).
'9 10 U.S.C. § 1107(0 (2000).
20 Id.
21 Supra note 14.
2003]
HEALTH M4 TRIX
of a drug or vaccine designed for a bioterrorist or biowarfare agent
(because it would be unethical to expose human volunteers to a poten-
tially lethal agent), should there be an alternative way for the FDA to
approve such agents for use in a war or other national emergency?
In 1999 the FDA proposed a set of new rules to permit the ap-
proval of such agents upon demonstration of safety in human subjects,
and efficacy in appropriate multiple animal studies, and these rules
were finalized in mid-2002. 22 Using multiple animal models for effi-
cacy testing seems reasonable in this context, since the FDA is right to
conclude it would be unethical to expose human subjects to toxins
which could be lethal to them (this would, for example, violate an-
other provision of the Nuremberg Code). But the ethical rule requir-
ing the informed consent of competent adults before they are sub-
jected to drugs or vaccines that have not been demonstrated effective
in human populations is equally applicable. No soldier or civilian
should be required to take any such drug or vaccine (which would be
offered on the basis that it could be effective) where the only scientific
support for efficacy is the result of animal studies.
III. INFORMED CONSENT TO THE ANTHRAX
VACCINE
Anthrax vaccine has been approved for use to prevent cutaneous
anthrax and was mandatorily given to the troops in the Gulf War on
the basis that it was an approved agent that could be given for an un-
approved but closely-related use (inhalation anthrax).23 This vaccine
was developed in 1970. After the Gulf War, DOD signed a sole
source contract with a new company, Bioport, to produce anthrax vac-
24cine. In 1998 Secretary of Defense William Cohen ordered that all
active duty troops be given the anthrax vaccine, which was to be de-
22 See New Drug and Biological Drug Products; Evidence Needed to Dem-
onstrate Efficacy of New Drugs for Use Against Lethal or Permanently Disabling
Toxic Substances When Efficacy Studies in Humans Ethically Cannot Be Conducted,
64 Fed. Reg. 53,960 (proposed Oct. 5, 1999) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 314 and
601) (seeking to approve drugs without human efficacy trials if they treat or prevent
life-threatening conditions). See also New Drug and Biological Drug Products; Evi-
dence Needed to Demonstrate Effectiveness of New Drugs When Human Efficacy
Studies Are Not Ethical or Feasible; Final Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 37,988, 37,989 (May
31, 2002) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 314 and 601) (finalizing the approval of
marketing of drugs for life-threatening illnesses based only on animal models).
23 The vaccine has been shown to protect rhesus monkeys from inhalation
anthrax. See Terry C. Dixon et al., Medical Progress: Anthrax, 341 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 815, 822 (1999).
24 Thomas V. Inglesby et al., Anthrax as a Biological Weapon: Medical and
Public Health Management, 281 JAMA 1735, 1740 (1999).
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livered in a series of six injections over an 18 month period.25 Some
soldiers refused, and challenged the orders, arguing that the vaccine
was experimental and thus could not be given without informed con-
sent. Many of them were court-martialed.26 Anthrax vaccination was
halted in 2001 when supplies ran out and the sole-source company
was shut down by the FDA for failure to maintain proper manufactur-
ing standards.27 Production and military vaccination resumed in
2002.28 There is no evidence of any military personnel or installation
ever being attacked by anthrax anywhere in the world.
The bioterrorist anthrax attacks in the U.S. were on civilians, none
of whom had been vaccinated. The recommended course of treatment
for exposure to anthrax is 60 days of antibiotics, and antibiotics were
made available to the 10,000 people potentially exposed.29 The an-
thrax vaccine was not available to civilians in October or November.
In late December, 2001, however, DOD agreed to supply sufficient
vaccine to vaccinate the 10,000 exposed civilians. Since the anthrax
vaccine was an investigational drug when used for postexposure inha-
lation anthrax, it could only be used in the context of a clinical trial,
and then only with the informed consent of the subjects.3 °
The FDA and CDC designed a consent form, together with a
counseling process, for use in obtaining the consent of the exposed
civilians to participate in the research project. Unlike the case of the
military in the Gulf War, or even the peacetime military with the an-
thrax vaccine, in which the government required soldiers to be vacci-
nated, the choice was left entirely to individuals. Government offi-
cials did not even make a recommendation as to what they thought
25 Steven Lee Myers, U.S. Army Forces to be Vaccinated Against Anthrax,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1997, at Al.
26 Kelly Morris, U.S. Military Face Punishment for Refusing Anthrax Vac-
cine, 353 LANCET 130 (1999). See also Laura Johannes & Mark Maremont, Injecting
Doubt: Worries about Safety of its Anthrax Vaccine Put the Army in a Bind, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 12, 2002, at Al (explaining that as of Oct. 12, 2002, 102 service men and
women were court-martialed for refusing to take the vaccine).
27 Jon Cohen & Eliot Marshall, Vaccines for Biodefense: A System in Dis-
tress, 294 Sci. 498, 500 (2001).
28 Wade-Hahn Chan, What Are You Taking for That?, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS,
Oct. 23, 2002, at 23.
29 Altman, supra note 9.
30 See Lawrence K. Altman, In Offering Anthrax Vaccines, Officials Admit to
Unknowns, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2001, at F5 (noting that "[r]ecipients must sign a
five-page form that explains the experimental nature of the use and states that they
should not consider the vaccine a treatment for anthrax"). BioPort's contract with the
Pentagon may also permit it to sell up to 20% of its annual production to others.
Judith Miller, Anthrax Vaccine Maker Calls Finances Shaky, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5,
2002, at A 10.
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any individual should do. D.A. Henderson, the chief bioterrorist ad-
viser to the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), justified
this failure to recommend for or against taking the anthrax vaccine by
saying that there was insufficient information available to make a rec-
ommendation. 31 But on what basis could individuals make a decision
if those with the most experience with the anthrax vaccine refused
even to advise them about what action was medically reasonable?
Although no survey of the exposed civilians has been conducted,
it seems likely that the potential subjects mostly decided for them-
selves that their 60 days (or less) of antibiotics was sufficient protec-
tion. It is also unlikely that anyone who actually read and understood
the information in the consent forms provided (for adults, adolescents,
and children) would have chosen to take the vaccine. Specifically, the
consent forms (which are essentially identical) are five-page, single-
spaced documents. Designed for a clinical trial, the forms are none-
theless captioned "Anthrax Vaccine and Drugs Availability Program
for Persons Possibly Exposed to Inhaled Spores." Most of the form is
in regular typeface, but the following information is in bold:
Before you decide to take part in this program, there are
several important things that you should know...
-Anthrax vaccine has not been shown to prevent infec-
tion when given to people after exposure to anthrax
spores ...
-The vaccine that you will receive in this program has
not been approved by the Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA) for this use and is considered investiga-
tional...
• FDA has not approved this lot of vaccine (Lot FAV-
063) because the company's license to produce the
vaccine is under review...
• You should not consider the vaccine as a treatment
for anthrax. The vaccine given in this program has
not been shown to give long term protection against
anthrax.
• You may have undesirable side effects from taking
the vaccine.
31 Id. and Sheryl Gay Stolberg & David E. Rosenbaum, U.S. Will Offer An-
thrax Shots for Thousands, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2001, at Al.
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... DHHS is not making any recommendation whether
you should or should not take this vaccine. DHHS is mak-
ing the vaccine available to you to allow you to decide
whether or not you wish to use the vaccine.32
The form also tells potential subjects that the vaccine is to be
given in three injections, once every two weeks, and is to be supple-
mented by 40 days of additional antibiotics, although taking antibiot-
ics is not required to obtain the vaccine. A two-year follow up is
planned. The remainder of the form is in relatively standard language,
with the exception of the phrases, "Although unconfirmed, a recent
preliminary study suggests that the vaccine may be linked with an
increase in the number of birth defects when given during pregnancy.
At this time no one knows for sure whether this vaccine can cause
fetal harm." The adolescent and pediatric forms also note that the
vaccine has not been studied in anyone under the age of 18.
The fact that it is unethical to expose human subjects to poten-
tially lethal toxic agents does not, of course, mean that studies cannot
be undertaken with individuals who have been exposed by a terrorist
and who may need an investigational drug or vaccine that has not
been approved. The FDA's new regulations make provisions for such
research, and appropriately SO. 34 Of course, informed consent must be
an integral part of any such research project, even if advanced with
the hope of possible therapeutic benefit. The FDA reasonably recog-
nized this when it made the investigational anthrax vaccine available
to exposed civilians only with their informed consent. Informed
32 CDC, Anthrax Vaccine and Drugs Availability Program for Persons Pos-
sibly Exposed to Inhaled Spores, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/od/oc/meida/adolescent.pdf;
http://www.cdc.gov/od/oc/media/adult.pdf;
http://www.cdc.gov/od/oc/media/parental.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2003).
33 Id.
34 See New Drug and Biological Drug Products, Evidence Needed to Dem-
onstrate Effectiveness of New Drugs When Human Efficacy Studies Are Not Ethical
or Feasible, 67 Fed. Reg. 37,988, 37,990 (May 31, 2002) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R.
pts. 314 and 601) (noting that therapeutic benefits need not be established). The FDA
approved pyridostigmine bromide under this rule in February 2003, just prior to the
Iraq war. Donald G. McNeil, Drug Tested in Gulf War is Approved for Troops, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 6, 2003, at A19. This approval was not without controversy. Jennifer
Cohen, New Rule Triggers Debate Over Best Way to Test Drugs, 299 SCIENCE 1651
(2003).
35 Shankar Vedantam & Mary Pat Flaherty, CDC Pushed Paperwork for
Anthrax Vaccinations: 48 Congressional Aides Received Inoculations, WASH. POST,
Dec. 22, 2001, at A10.
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consent is not a form, nonetheless, the forms are worth reviewing for
what their content reveals about the proposed study.
One of the most striking provisions is that the FDA was willing to
enroll both children and pregnant women at the outset, even though
the vaccine has never been used in children, and even though there is
some evidence that it might be teratogenic. There is no ethical justifi-
cation for putting children or fetuses at risk at this time (there is no
evidence that any parent enrolled their child, or that any pregnant
woman enrolled), since the 60 days of antibiotic use has always been
a successful prophilaxis in humans. This seems to be another example
of FDA/National Institutes of Health (NIH) policy to try to do re-
search on children and women, without making distinctions about the
type of research and the likelihood of harm to the children and women
(as well as their fetuses) involved.36
The FDA does seem to have learned from its experience in the
Gulf War, and did seem to understand that there could be no justifica-
tion for waiving informed consent for competent adults, even in the
face of a bioterrorist attack and uncertainty about the usefulness of the
anthrax vaccine. Informed consent for research on competent adults
is always feasible and is always ethically required. Informed consent
is also required for treating competent adult civilians - only military
personnel agree to accept reasonable and necessary approved medical
procedures without specific consent.37 That is only one reason why it
is dangerous to civilians to argue that after 9/11 "we are all soldiers
now."
The anthrax attacks convinced Congress and the public that the
U.S. does not have sufficient safe and effective drugs and vaccines
available to respond to a bioterrorist or biowarfare attack on civilians.
The primary reason for the drastic increases in NIH funding, for ex-
ample, are to do research in areas that might lead to better bioterrorist-
36 See, e.g., Ass'n. of Am. Physicians and Surgeons v. FDA, 226 F. Supp. 2d
204 (D.D.C. 2002) (containing a challenge to FDA regulation requiring drug tests on
children). Almost a year later controversy erupted over a plan to test a diluted vac-
cinia vaccine (Dryvax) on children. Solicitation of Public Review and Comment on
Research Protocol: A Multicenter Randomized Dose Response Study of the Safety,
Clinical and Immune Response of Dryvax Administered to Children 2 to 5 Years of
Age, 67 Fed. Reg. 66,403 (Oct. 31, 2002). The plan to test the smallpox vaccine on
children was ultimately dropped.
37 And it is probably time to re-examine this policy, at least in peacetime, as
well. Moreover, the anthrax vaccine seems to be used currently in the military as a
protection against cutaneous anthrax (which it is licensed for, but which is no real risk
to soldiers) rather than as a protection against inhalation anthrax (which it is not li-
censed for, but which is a combat risk).
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related drugs and vaccines. 38  Congress agrees with the FDA that
these new agents should be approvable on the basis of animal studies
of efficacy. 39 There may, however, be indirect ways to test for human
efficacy (such as antibody levels and tests like those used to determine
the efficacy of diluted smallpox vaccine), and when such indirect hu-
man efficacy measures exist, their use should be required for FDA
approval.
A related question is whether there should be a new narrower
category of FDA approval for products that cannot be tested for effi-
cacy, and whose use would be limited to certain populations in spe-
cific circumstances. Although there is no precedent for this, terato-
genic drugs like accutane and thalidomide have labeling that attempts
to limit their prescription to people taking effective birth control
measures. 40 This is reasonable. Similarly, when drugs and vaccines
are developed for the use of soldiers in war it seems reasonable to
restrict their use to competent adults, and to exclude children. It also
seems reasonable to limit the use of the agent to military personnel -
at least if combat and the military mission are the rationales used to
approve the use - and to require that the product be labeled "For Mili-
tary Use Only."' If such a restriction is not made, there is at least the
potential for the drug to be used for other reasons (since once the drug
or vaccine is approved for one purpose, physicians can lawfully pre-
scribe it for others if it is available to civilians) although the primary
reason short cuts were taken in its testing was military necessity.
The labeling of bioterrorist drugs and vaccines is more compli-
cated because the consumers are primarily civilians. A label like,
"For Use Only in the Event of a National Emergency or Bioterrorist
Attack," might not be sufficient, although that will be the primary
reason the drug or vaccine has been approved without the usual re-
38 NIH Breaks Down How It Will Spend Bioterrorism Funds, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 19, 2002, at A4.
39 Congress required the FDA to adopt the regulation cited in note 22 by
legislation; see Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness Response Act
of 2002, H.R. 3448, 10 7th Cong. §§ 122-23 (2002); Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of
2001, S. 1765, 107'h Cong. §§ 405-06 (2001); both of which contained this language
which became law in 2002,
40 See, e.g., George J. Annas & Sherman Elias, Thalidomide and the Titanic:
Reconstructing the Technology Tragedies of the Twentieth Century, 89 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 98 (1999) (describing the FDA's most stringent postmarking monitoring ever
used for reintroduction of thalidomide, which caused serious birth defects in the
1950s and 1960s).
41 During the Gulf War pyridostigmine bromide (as a pretreatment for a
poison gas attack) was labeled "For military use and evaluation" instead of the usual
IND label, "Caution: New Drug-Limited by Federal Law to Investigational Use." It
was approved for use by the troops just prior to the Iraq war. See supra note 34.
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quired human efficacy studies. To permit it to be used by physicians
for other purposes is not justified.
In reality, however, it is probably not the labeling as much as the
physical control of these new drugs and vaccines that will matter. For
example, if the products are all manufactured under military or HHS
contract, and the entire supply is controlled either by DOD or HHS,
their availability and use will be governed by these agencies, and the
drugs and vaccines will not be available to private physicians or the
general public (except in times of national emergency) in any event.
This, for example, is the current situation with the anthrax vaccine
that is wholly supplied by a single manufacturer who is under contract
only to manufacture it for DOD. That is why only DOD can authorize
its supply to others, as it did in December, 2001 .42 Anthrax research
continues on a number of fronts: can fewer than six shots of the cur-
rent vaccine provide immunity?, can a test for antibodies in the blood
measure immunity?, what side effects have been experienced by the
military personnel who have taken the vaccine?, and, of course, can a
better vaccine be developed to replace the current one that is "old,
inefficient and the cause of many complaints. ' 43
There is a tendency to jettison fundamental rules that protect citi-
zens against arbitrary government action, especially those like in-
formed consent, in times of war or crises like bioterrorism. Reflection
has caused us to regret our haste in waiving informed consent in the
Gulf War and this mistake was not repeated during the Iraq War. Not
only was informed consent feasible with the troops, but the use of
pyridostigmine bromide as a pretreatment to a soman attack is contra-
indicated for the primary chemical agent the Iraqis actually had in
their arsenal, sarin. When confronted with this fact by U.S. Senator
Jay Rockefeller in a Senate hearing in 1997 General Norman
Schwarzkopf admitted that the military was responding primarily out
of fear rather than knowledge, saying: ". . . we were scared to death
of the Iraqi chemical weapons ... what you are probably recounting,
is a reaction, perhaps an overreaction to coming up with any kind of
antidote that they could come up with to prevent our troops from be-
ing killed by chemical weapons." 4 At a later 1997 hearing before the
same panel, General Colin Powell testified that he approved the drugs
and vaccines used "with the full assurance from the FDA that they
42 But see Judith Miller, supra note 30.
43 Eliot Marshall, Anthrax Vaccine Begins a New Round of Tests, 295
SCIENCE 427, 427 (2002).
44 Persian Gulf War Illnesses, Part II: Hearing Before the Comm. on Veter-
ans'Affairs United States Senate, 10 5 th Cong. 26 (1997) (testimony of General Nor-
man H. Schwarzkopf, U.S. Army Retired).
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were safe for human use and that they were effective. 'A5 In other
words, the federal agencies were wrongly relying on the expertise of
each other rather than exercising their own independent judgment:
FDA granted DOD's request for a combat waiver of consent because
it believed that its use was a military decision for DOD to make, and
DOD used the drugs and vaccines it did because it thought a drug
safety decision had been made by the FDA.
There is no reason for civilians (or soldiers) to have to trade safety
for liberty in an emergency in which unapproved or partially-tested
drugs or vaccines are made available. The choice to use them should
continue to be an individual's choice, as it properly was for civilians
in the case of the anthrax vaccine. The public health or military au-
thorities that make these drugs and vaccines available, however,
should only do so if they are prepared to recommend their use. Oth-
erwise the decision to make them available becomes purely a political
one, made to cover the behinds of government officials, not a medical
46or public health one.
IV. THE "MODEL" STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH
POWERS ACT
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11 and the subsequent anthrax at-
tacks, hospitals, cities, states, and federal officials began developing
or revisiting plans for future biological attacks. The federal response
almost immediately emphasized stockpiling drugs and vaccines that
could be used to respond to a future attack, especially one involving
smallpox.47 Other initiatives have proposed enhancing the public
health infrastructure of the country (especially its ability to monitor
emergency department diagnoses and pharmacy sales of relevant
drugs), and the training of first responders to recognize and treat the
diseases most likely to be caused by a bioterrorist attack (such as an-
thrax, smallpox, and plague). Major efforts are also underway to im-
45 Persian Gulf War Illnesses, Part III: Hearing Before the Comm. on Vet-
erans Affairs United States Senate, 105th Cong. 14 (1997) (testimony of General
Colin Powell, Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff).
46 In this regard there are many lessons to be learned from the 1976 attempt
to vaccinate all Americans against swine flu. See, e.g., RICHARD E. NEUSTADT &
HARVEY V. FINEBERG, THE SWINE FLU AFFAIR: DECISION-MAKING ON A SLIPPERY
DISEASE (U.S. Dept. HEW, 1978). See also GINA KOLATA, FLU: THE STORY OF THE
GREAT INFLUENZA PANDEMIC OF 1918 AND THE SEARCH FOR THE VIRUS THAT CAUSED
IT 129-95 (1999).
47 See William Broad, U.S. Acts to Make Vaccines and Drugs Against Small-




prove coordination and communication among local, state, and federal
officials responsible for emergencies, and to more clearly delineate
lines of authority involving "homeland security." All of these are
reasonable and responsible steps our government should take.
On the other hand, planning for mass quarantine and forced vac-
cination - likely with investigational vaccines - are unreasonable
steps that are more likely to foster public panic and distrust than to be
effective in a real emergency. Mass quarantine was a staple of public
health from the 14th century to the early 201h century, and its imple-
mentation has been historically justified by labeling those groups
quarantined as not only dangerous but almost diabolical. 48 As histo-
rian-physician Howard Markel has put it:
History teaches us that society has no shortage of means
available to dehumanize and minimize so-called undesirable
groups of people. The grave risks of this minimization proc-
ess are magnified when combined with the threat of conta-
gious disease. It is at this moment that rhetorical scapegoat-
ing may be transformed into a mentality of quarantine. Not
only does the infectious disease become the 'enemy' but, so,
do the human beings (and their contacts) who have encoun-
tered the microbe in question. A common symptom of the
quarantine mentality is to do everything possible to prevent
the spread of an epidemic, often at the neglect of the human
or medical needs of those labeled contagious.49
Properly worried that many state public health laws are outdated
and perhaps inadequate to permit state officials from effectively con-
taining an epidemic caused by a bioterrorist attack, in the wake of
9/11 the CDC advised all states to review the adequacies of their laws
with special attention to quarantining people in the event of a small-
pox attack. ° In addition, the CDC released a proposed model law for
the states, entitled the "Model State Emergency Health Powers
48 HOWARD MARKEL, QUARANTINE!: EAST EUROPEAN JEWISH IMMIGRANTS
AND THE NEW YORK CITY EPIDEMICS OF 1892 185-86 (1997).
49 id
50 See CDC Smallpox Response Plan and Guidelines, available at
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/response-plan/index.asp (laying out state and
local guidelines for vaccination). See also Justin Gillis & Ceci Connolly, U.S. Details
Response to Smallpox: Cities Could be Quarantined and Public Events Banned,
WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 2001, at Al (suggesting increased awareness by public officials




Act"(model act) on October 23, 2001.51 The act was written under
extreme time pressure and in the state of high emotion. Co-drafter
51 This model was released on October 23, 2001 to great fanfare, but has
since been removed from the sponsor's website. A copy is on file with the author. I
first saw the model act on October 31 when it was emailed to me by project director
James G. Hodge, Jr. On November 1, I emailed him and the distribution list the fol-
lowing response:
Dear Mr. Hodge: Thanks for bringing your draft model law to my atten-
tion. There certainly is a need to improve our public health infrastructure
and to find new and effective drugs and vaccines to deal with the threat of
bioterrorism. I think uniform state laws can be a useful tool for state legis-
latures and that some good could come out of this exercise. I do not how-
ever think your current proposal is helpful, since it treats both American
citizens and American physicians and hospitals as the enemy, and grants
unnamed and unaccountable "public health officials" unprecedented (and I
think unconstitutional) power to compel both citizens and their physicians
to undergo testing and treatment and perhaps quarantine with no standards
as to how these powers are to be applied or reviewed. This is, of course, the
old Soviet model of public health (lots of power and no standards for apply-
ing it), hardly a "new" American model. The problem RIGHT NOW is not
the lack of public health power, but a lack of public health honesty (about
how little is known about anthrax, for example) and the lack of vaccines
and drugs to deal with various risks. It is NOT the case that Americans are
resisting being tested or treated (what makes you think this is the prob-
lem?); rather it is the CDC and other public health officials who are urging
Americans who are lining up to be screened for anthrax in New York City,
for example, to go home and not worry about it, and people who want to
begin antibiotic treatment immediately not to do so. Also, I have not wit-
nessed any physicians or hospitals around the country that have failed to of-
fer full voluntary cooperation with public health and even law enforcement
officials.
In short, this seems to be an overreaction to a crisis that significantly misses
the mark. I urge you not to stick to an unrealistic November 7 rewrite dead-
line, but to take the time to do a more thoughtful job on this. Such a rewrite
would require, among other things, much more careful attention to defini-
tions (including limiting mandatory actions to communicable diseases), tak-
ing the constitutional rights of American more seriously (and not trying to
rely so heavily on Jacobson, a case that is almost 100 years old and that re-
flects both old public health practice and outdated constitutional law), treat
Americans as the beneficiaries and friends of public health, not as your
enemies; treat private physicians and hospitals as allies, not enemies; and
develop explicit and understandable standards under which power over in-
dividuals and private institutions can be exercised; and eliminate the immu-
nity provisions.
I hope these comments are helpful, and would be happy to discuss any or all
of them with you. Sincerely, George J. Annas (copy of email on file with
the author; there was no response from the authors of the Model Act).
Shortly thereafter, on Nov. 7, 2001, Janlori Goldman and Joanne L. Hustead of
Georgetown University's Institute for Health Care Research and Policy, wrote Larry
Gostin a much longer letter, saying among other things:
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Steve Teret, for example, explained that he had just finished reading
Josd Saramago's Blindness when asked to help on this project. He
Given the current political climate and the intense desire of policymakers
and the public to be fully prepared for similar attacks and acts of bioterror-
ism, we believe it is critical for proponents of any proposed model legisla-
tion to be especially vigilant in protecting civil liberties and privacy rights.
As an initial matter, we are extremely concerned with the breathtakingly
expansive scope of the definition of "public health emergency" - a defini-
tion that is central to the invocation of the extraordinary powers granted to
state authorities. Most alarming is the inclusion of "epidemic" and "pan-
demic" in this definition (terms which themselves are not defined). We ap-
proached this model with the understanding that it was intended to combat
new, emerging threats, specifically the outbreak of disease caused by bioter-
rorism, but the model act, as drafted, appears to allow the existence of any
epidemic, whatever the cause, to trigger the emergency powers vested in
state authorities - powers that include the ability to quarantine individuals
and compel treatment...
We do not argue that quarantine, isolation, or forced treatment - with the
obvious attendant loss of liberty and autonomy - are never an appropriate
exercise of government power. There may be circumstances where such ac-
tion is the only and last resort. We do question, however, the breadth of
situations in which state authorities would have these powers under the
model act, and we urge you to more precisely define and limit the circum-
stances under which such extraordinary powers could be invoked...
We have several concerns about the draft's approach to protecting the pri-
vacy of medical information.
The draft does not consistently restrict access to protected health informa-
tion (PHI) to those within the public health authority (or the public safety
authority) with a need to know, or put explicit limits on disclosure of such
PHI by state authorities. Several sections, notably section 201 (which cre-
ates a mandatory reporting system), section 202 (which requires public
health authorities to identify, interview, and counsel exposed individuals
and track other potentially exposed individuals), and section 203 (which re-
quires public health and public safety authorities to share information about
reportable illnesses) will result in the accumulation of PHI by public health
and safety authorities. We believe it is essential for this model law to state
explicitly that all PHI collected or received by state public health or public
safety authorities will be available only to those within the authorities with
a need to know. (Section 2043(c)'s reference to exchanges between "au-
thorized personnel" is a start.) It also is essential for this model law to pro-
hibit disclosures of PHI by state authorities, with stated exceptions that are
limited to the reasons why the information was collected in the first place.
(letter on file with the author)
In retrospect such comments were inevitable. As two sympathetic commentators put
it, "In their understandable haste, the Georgetown-Hopkins drafting group also pro-
duced a confusing document, posted first and discussed afterwards." John M.
Colmers & Daniel M. Fox, The Politics of Emergency Health Powers and the Isola-
tion of Public Health, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 397, 398 (2003). And see generally,
Ronald Bayer & James Colgrove, Rights and Dangers: Bioterrorism and the Ideolo-




told an interviewer that the horrific quarantine described in this fic-
tional epidemic of blindness was something he could not get out of his
mind. In his words, "It was the most disturbing book I've ever
read.
52
The draft act permits the Governor to declare a public health
emergency, after which the state's public health officials are given
extraordinary power to essentially take over all of the health care fa-
cilities in the state, order physicians to act in certain ways, and order
citizens to submit to examinations and treatment on the threat of being
quarantined or criminally punished for refusing. Under the act, public
health officials, and those working under their authority, are immune
from liability for their actions (except for gross negligence and willful
misconduct), including those which cause permanent injury or death.
Specifically, the act defines a public health emergency (the condition
that permits the Governor to declare a state of public health emer-
gency), as "an occurrence or imminent threat of an illness or health
condition, caused by bioterrorism, epidemic or pandemic disease, or
novel and highly fatal infections agent or biological toxin, that poses a
substantial risk of a significant number of human fatalities or incidents
of permanent or long-term disability. 53
An emergency declaration permits the Governor to suspend state
regulations, transfer personnel, and mobilize the militia. All public
health personnel will be issued special identification badges, which
they shall wear "in plain view" that "shall indicate the authority of the
bearer to exercise public health functions and emergency powers..."
In regard to health care facilities, public health personnel may "com-
pel a health care facility to provide services or the use of its facility if
such services or use are reasonable and necessary for emergency re-
sponse ... includ[ing] transferring the management and supervision
of the health care facility to the public health authority ....
Public health personnel are given exceptionally broad powers, and
failure of physicians and citizens to follow their orders is a crime:
Sec. 502(a)(4) Individual examination or testing. Any per-
son refusing to submit to the medical examination and/or test-
ing is liable for a misdemeanor. If the public health authority
52 Susan Muaddi Darraj, Model Legislation. Balancing Civil Rights and
Public Policy, JoHNs HoPKtNs PUB. HEALTH MAG., Late Fall 2001, at 18. In the same
article Gostin is quoted as saying that the model act is "polished and strong because
we had a brain trust of the best public health minds at Hopkins and the best legal
minds at Georgetown, thus ensuring the best dividends for our nation." Id.
53 Model Act, Sec. 104(f) at p. 11, supra note 51.
54 Id., sec. 402(b), at 20, supra note 5 1.
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is uncertain whether a person who refuses to undergo medical
examination and/or testing may have been exposed to an in-
fectious disease or otherwise poses a danger to public health,
the public health authority may subject the individual to isola-
tion or quarantine.
Sec. 502(b) Health care provider assistance. To require any
physician or other health care provider to perform the medical
examination and/or testing. Any person refusing to perform a
medical examination or test as authorized herein shall be li-
able for a misdemeanor... An order of the public health au-
thority given to effectuate the purposes of this subsection
shall be immediately enforceable by any peace officer.
Sec. 504(b) Vaccination and treatment. Individuals refus-
ing to be vaccinated or treated shall be liable for a misde-
meanor. If, by reason of refusal of vaccination or treatment,
the person poses a danger to the public health, he or she may
be subject to isolation or quarantine ... (c) An order of the
public health authority ... shall be immediately enforceable
by any peace officer.55
Of course, state public health, police, fire, and emergency plan-
ners should be clear about their authority, and to the extent the model
act encourages states to review their emergency laws this is construc-
tive. On the other hand, many of the provisions of this model act,
especially those giving authority of public health officials over physi-
cians and hospitals, and authority to quarantine without meaningful
standards, seem to be based on the assumption that neither physicians
nor the public are likely to cooperate with public health officials in the
aftermath of a biothrrorist attack, and that panic is likely. This as-
sumption itself seems to be based on the results of tabletop exercises
involving simulated bioterrorist attacks, including TOPOFF and Dark
Winter. TOPOFF involved a simulated bioterrorist attack on Denver
by using aerosolized Yersinia pestis, the bacteria that causes plague.
5 6
" Id. at 25-29.
56 TopOff (Top Officials) was a Congressionally mandated exercise to simu-
late three simultaneous attacks: chemical in New Hampshire, nuclear in Washington,
D.C., and biological in Denver. The most dramatic was the scenario involving the
aerosol release of pneumonic plague at the Denver Performing Arts Center and the
four-day sequel played out in May 2000 which included the closing of Colorado's
borders on day three. Among the questions raised by Denver TopOff were: who is in
charge, how to handle drug supply, how to avoid a hospital crisis, whether and how to
quarantine those infected, and whether to close city and state borders to contain the




Dark Winter was a tabletop exercise that simulated a smallpox attack
on Oklahoma City. 57 Using these simulated cases as a basis for legis-
lation, however, is unreasonable given the overwhelming voluntary
cooperation of the public, physicians, and hospitals to both 9/11 and
the anthrax attacks.
Selective blindness was perhaps inevitable, and led to three major
objections to the initial version of the model act. First, it is far too
broad, applying as it does not just to a smallpox attack, but to non-
emergency conditions as diverse as our annual flu epidemic and the
HIV epidemic. 58 Second, although it may make sense to put public
health officials in charge of responding to a smallpox attack, it may
57 Dark Winter, played out June 22 and 23, 2001, was a simulated smallpox
attack on Oklahoma City. The exercise resulted in five major "learning points," in-
cluding that biological weapons could threaten vital national security interests, current
organizational structures are not well suited to managing a biological attack, there is
no surge capacity in our health system, dealing with the media is critical, and finally,
"Should a contagious bioweapon pathogen be used, containing the spread of disease
will present significant ethical, political, cultural, operational and legal challenges.
THE ANSER INSTITUTE FOR HOMELAND SECURITY, DARK WINTER, at
http://www.homelandsecurity.org/darkwinter/index.cfm (last visited Jan. 19, 2003).
58 See Wendy Parmet & Wendy K. Mariner, A Health Act that Jeopardizes
Public Health, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 1, 2001, at A15 (noting that the definition of
"emergency" in the Model Act is too broad and without review). See also letter of the
New England Coalition for Law & Public Health to Secretary Tommy Thompson,
dated Nov. 13, 2001 which reads in part:
It is especially important today that public health retain the trust of the
American public. The Model Act risks jeopardizing the public's confidence
in both state and federal public health agencies by viewing public health as
an arm of law enforcement rather than as an independent health protection
profession. The Act treats the American public, rather than a chemical, bio-
logic, disease (or even terrorist) as the source of the problem. It relies on
coercion to the exclusion of identifying and reducing risks, distributing
medicines, and educating the public about prevention and treatment. This
approach will neither protect the public health nor support the efforts of
public health officials. To sustain public support for public health meas-
ures, both now and in the long run, public health officials must be viewed as
acting in the interest of the population. This cannot happen if they are seen
as seeking extreme, unnecessary powers that can be used arbitrarily, against
individuals who have committed no crime but becoming ill.
We firmly believe that there is no need for model legislation enhancing
public health's emergency powers. If there is any value in changing some
state laws affecting public health, it lies in placing constitutional limits on
the use of emergency powers to make the text of old statutes consistent with
modem practices and amending statutes to provide and facilitate true com-
mitments to public health . . . Signed by George J. Annas, Leonard H.
Glantz, Wendy K. Mariner, Frances H. Miller, Patricia A. Roche, Richard
A. Daynard, Wendy E. Parmet, Anthony Robbins, Eileen O'Neil, and
Nicholas A. Ashford (on file with author).
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not make sense to put them in charge of responding to every type of a
bioterrorism event. This is because although the state public health
department has a major role to play in limiting the public's exposure
to a bioterrorist agent, contact identification, information gathering
and dissemination, most of the actual treatment of affected individuals
and preventive actions at the level of identifiable patients will be done
by physicians, nurses, emergency medical personnel, and hospitals.
59
The primary role of public health authorities will usually be, as it was
after the anthrax attacks, to provide guidance to the public and other
government officials about how to identify and deal with the disease,
and to provide laboratory facilities to assess exposure and definitively
establish diagnoses.
The third objection to the act is that there is no evidence from ei-
ther 9/11 or the anthrax attacks that physicians, nurses, or members of
the public panic, are reluctant to cooperate in responding to a bioter-
rorist attack, or are reluctant to take drugs or vaccines recommended
by public health or medical officials. Quite the opposite, physicians
and hospitals in the areas affected, universally volunteered their time,
space, and expertise to respond to 9/11, and the public lined up to be
tested for anthrax and stockpiled ciprofloxacin. Instead of resisting
treatment or testing, the public actually wanted treatment and testing
so much that the CDC had to publicly recommend against both. 60 The
major problem in a bioterror attack or epidemic will be delivering
drugs to a public that is demanding them, not forcing treatment. An-
other important lesson learned from 9/11 was that Americans are pri-
marily concerned about the safety of their families - and it will not be
possible to separate them from their families if they do not believe
separation is in their family's best interests.
59 See Donald A. Henderson, Public Health Preparedness, in SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY 1N A VULNERABLE WORLD: SUPPLEMENT TO AAAS SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY POLICY YEARBOOK 2003 37 (Albert H. Teich et al. eds., 2002), avail-
able at http://www.aaas.org/spp/yearbook/2003/yrbk03.htm (expressing need to pre-
pare physicians at local level to respond to bioterrorism). And as bioterrorist expert
Margaret Hamberg has noted, "A strong and robust public health system requires
effective working partnerships with the medical care community." Margaret A.
Hamburg Addressing Bioterrorist Threats: Where Do We Go from Here? 5
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 564, 564 (1999).
60 Jonathan Bor, Americans are Taking Antibiotics into own Hands, in Case
of Anthrax: Officials Vainly Caution Against Stockpiling, Random Self-medication,
BALT. SUN, Oct. 13, 2001, at 5A; see also Postal Service Security: Hearing on Postal
Service Security Before the Senate Comm. on Government Affairs, 106 th Cong. (Oct.




Of course anthrax is not spread from person-to-person like small-
pox. The response could have been different in a Dark Winter-type
smallpox attack, or if thousands or tens of thousands of people had
become infected with anthrax. Nonetheless, there is no empirical evi-
dence to suggest that a draconian state criminal quarantine law of the
type authorized in the act is necessary or desirable. Individuals with
smallpox, for example, are most infectious only after they develop
fever and a rash; and then they are usually so sick and immobile that
they will likely accept whatever care is available. 61 Moreover, the
"long incubation period (10-17 days before a rash develops) almost
ensures that some persons who are infected in the [smallpox] attack
will have traveled great distances from the site of exposure before the
disease is recognized or quarantine could be implemented. 62 The key
to an effective public health response is making voluntary treatment
available. Without a sufficient supply of smallpox vaccine, for exam-
ple, even police-supported quarantine would not likely be effective.
People will come to centers for treatment; they will obviously flee if
they do not want treatment and all that is offered is confinement and
separation from their families.
Finally, even if it is concluded that a quarantine law might be use-
ful to respond to a bioterrorist-induced emergency (e.g., by permitting
the few unwilling Americans, if there are any, to be treated, vacci-
nated, or quarantined), such a law should be a federal law, not a state
law. This is because bioterrorism is a matter of national security, not
just state police powers. Existing federal quarantine law based on the
commerce clause (and which has special provisions for tuberculosis,
cholera, plague, smallpox, viral hemorrhagic fever and yellow fever)
could usefully be examined and updated to deal with bioterrorism.
63
Moreover, to the extent that the federal government funds "dual use"
public health infrastructure, federal public health officials will be able
to dictate its use. The Governors of the states involved in actual an-
thrax attacks all realized that bioterrorism is fundamentally a federal
61 E.g., Donald A. Henderson et al., Smallpox as a Biological Weapon:
Medical and Public Health Management, 281 JAMA 2127, 2129 (1999).
62 Joseph Barbera et al., Large-Scale Quarantine Following Biological Ter-
rorism in the United States: Scientific Examination, Logistic and Legal Limits, and
Possible Consequences, 286 JAMA 2711, 2714 (2001).
63 See Public Health Service, 42 U.S.C. § 264 (2001) (noting use of authority
by the Surgeon General to control communicable disease outbreak); Quarantine,
inspection, licensing: interstate quarantine, 42 C.F.R. 70 (2000). Of course bioterror-
ism is fundamentally a global issue as well. See Wendy Mariner, The Wrong Re-
sponse, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 17, 2001, at A20, and David F. Fidler, Bioterrorism, Public
Health, and International Law, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 7 (2002).
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issue, and quickly called for action by both the FBI and the CDC to
deal with the attacks.
64
V. CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC HEALTH
EMERGENCIES
The act is premised on a not uncommon belief that in public
health emergencies there must be a tradeoff between protecting civil
rights and effective public health interventions. 65 There is, of course,
precedent for this belief, and the preamble to the model act cites the
1905 case of Jacobson v. Massachusetts for the proposition that "the
whole people covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with the
whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the 'com-
mon good." 66 Jacobson involved a Massachusetts statute that permit-
ted local boards of health to require vaccinations when they deemed it
"necessary for the public health or safety." There were no quarantine
provisions in that law, and refusal was punishable by a $5 fine. Vac-
cination refusals at the beginning of the last century - before the Flex-
ner report - were anticipated because vaccination itself remained con-
troversial, there were no antibiotics, physicians were not universally
trusted, science and medicine was in its infancy, and hospitals were
seen primarily as "pest houses."67 Trade offs between civil liberties
(the right to refuse treatment) and public health (mandatory vaccina-
tions) seemed necessary in such circumstances. There was no FDA,
no such thing as an investigational drug or vaccine, and the doctrine
of informed consent wouldn't be articulated for more than half a cen-
tury.
The U.S. Supreme Court cited the military draft as precedent for
upholding the Massachusetts law. 68 The point is not that the constitu-
64 See, e.g., Eric Lipton, On a Day of Jitters, City and F.B.I. Differ Over
Anthrax Sweep at ABC, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2001, at B6 (discussing the combination
of local police and federal agents during the anthrax outbreak at ABC).
65 James G. Hodge, Jr., Bioterrorism Law and Policy: Critical Choice's for
Public Health, 30 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 254 (2002). The drafters knew quarantine and
restricting civil liberties would be controversial. As James Hodge put it in November,
2001, "They [vaccination and quarantine] are the central issues of this act, and they
will probably be the most controversial." Quoted by Deidre Davidson, Health Cen-
ter's Quarantine Proposal Sparks Debate, Boston Law Tribune, Nov. 12, 2001 at 1,
2. More recently Hodge has said: "These are not going to be popular measures, but
necessary ones." Quoted by Marcia Coyle, Bioterror Law Gains Ground, NAT'L L.J.,
Sept., 23, 2001, Al, A8, available at http://www.nlj.com/archive/0923.shtml.
66 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27 (1905).
67 CHARLES ROSENBERG, THE CARE OF STRANGERS: THE RISE OF AMERICA'S
HOSPITAL SYSTEM 15-32, 209-11 (1987).
68 Jacobson, supra note 66, at 29.
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tion does not give the government wide latitude to respond in times of
war and public health emergencies - it does; the point is that civil
rights tradeoffs are not always required for effective public health
response. Just as we have been able to abolish the draft and go to an
all volunteer armed forces, so it seems reasonable to think that we can
predictably rely on well-informed Americans - who are not the enemy
in a bioterrorist attack - to follow the reasonable instructions of gov-
ernment officials they trust for their own protection.
Almost one hundred years after Jacobson, neither medicine nor
constitutional law is what it was. We now take constitutional rights
much more seriously, including the constitutional right of a competent
adult to refuse any medical treatment, even lifesaving treatment. 69 Of
course, we still would permit public health officials to quarantine in-
dividuals who have a serious communicable disease who either cannot
or will not accept treatment for it or agree to stay in their home, and
who threaten to infect others with it, such as active tuberculosis. Even
then, however, we require public officials to use the "least restrictive
alternative" and resort to quarantine only after other interventions,
such as directly observed therapy, have failed.70  Involuntary con-
finement almost always represents a failure of modern public health.
It also must be accompanied by procedural due process protections,
including the right to legal representation and to a judicial hearing. 7'
The act seems to have been drafted for a different age, and would
be more at home in the U.S. of the 191h century rather than the 2 1st .
Today, all adults have the constitutional right to refuse examination
and treatment, and such a refusal should not result in involuntary con-
finement simply on the simple say so of a public health official. At
the very least, the individual with a contagious disease should have
69 See George J. Annas, The Bell Tolls for a Constitutional Right to Physi-
cian-Assisted Suicide, 337 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1098 (1997) (discussing Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) and Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997)). See also
Sell v. U.S., 2003 U.S. LEXIS 4594 (June 16, 2003) (prisoner awaiting trial may not
be medicated against his will to make him competent to stand trial without a judicial
hearing and a finding that the medication is both necessary to further essential gov-
ernmental interests and is in the patient's best medical interest in light of his medical
condition).
70 See, e.g., Greene v. Edwards, 263 S.E.2d 661, 663 (W.Va. 1980) (stating
specific procedural safeguards that must be followed before committing individuals
for tuberculosis treatment); City of Newark v. J.S., 652 A.2d 265, 272 (N.J. Super. L.
1993); George J. Annas, Control of Tuberculosis: The Law and the Public's Health,
328 NEW ENG. J. MED. 585 (1993). The analogy modem courts have adopted is to the
due process protection now constitutionally-required to confine a person to an institu-
tion because they are mentally ill and dangerous.
71 Id. See generally, Wendy Parmet, AIDS and Quarantine: The Revival of
an Archaic Doctrine, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 53 (1985).
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the option of identifying a qualified examining physician of their own,
and if isolation is necessary, isolating him or herself in their own
home. Requiring physicians to treat patients against their will and
against their medical judgment under penalty of criminal law has no
precedent at all, makes no ethical or legal sense, and can only produce
destructive conflict. Governors already have broad emergency pow-
ers; there is no compelling reason to expand them.
72
Constitutional rights need not be compromised for effective pub-
lic health intervention. But even if policy makers were unconcerned
with restricting civil liberties, such a strategy as that outlined in the
model act would be counterproductive. This is because the proposal
is likely to undermine public trust in public health, trust that is abso-
lutely essential to containing panic in a bioterrorist-induced epidemic.
Unlike 1900, for example, we now have 24 hour a day news televi-
sion, the internet, cell phones, and automobiles. These make effective
large-scale quarantine impossible unless the public is convinced that it
is absolutely necessary to prevent the spread of fatal disease and is
fairly and safely administered. Making it a crime to disobey a public
health officer, for example, will only increase public distrust in that it
proclaims that public officials cannot provide valid reasons for their
actions. Former Senator Sam Nunn, who played the president in the
Dark Winter exercise, accurately observed after it was over: "There is
no force on earth strong enough to get 250 million Americans to do
something they do not believe is in their own best interests or that of
their families. 73
The necessity for maintaining public trust and confidence also
means that the argument that in a public health emergency there must
be a tradeoff between effective public health and protecting civil
rights is simply wrong. As the AIDS epidemic has demonstrated, the
promotion of human rights can be essential to deal effectively with an
epidemic. Public health officials recognized early that draconian
mandatory HIV screening measures, for example, would simply help
drive the epidemic underground where it would spread faster and
wider.74 Likewise, draconian quarantine measures seem most likely to
create public panic that will encourage people to avoid public health
officials and physicians rather than seek them out. In this regard, pro-
72 See supra note 58.
73 Quoted by Tara O'Toole, oral presentation, Boston University School of
Public Health, October 18, 2002.
74 See, e.g., Lawrence Gostin & Jonathan Mann, Toward the Development of
a Human Rights Impact Assessment for Formulation and Evaluation of Public Health




tection of civil liberties is a core ingredient to successfully responding
to a bioterrorist attack. Treating our fellow citizens as the enemy, and
using police tactics or martial law to force treatment and isolate them,
is much more likely to cost lives than to save them. This is one reason
why there has not been a large-scale quarantine in the U.S. since
World War I, and why bioterrorism experts doubt that a mass quaran-
tine could be effective.75
VI. THE REVISED MODEL ACT
On December 21, 2001, in response to criticisms of the model act,
including those I have summarized, a revised version was released.
No one any longer considers the act a "model." Instead, the Decem-
ber version is labeled simply a "draft for discussion." The December
version does "not represent the official policy, endorsement, or views"
of anyone, including the authors themselves and the CDC.76 As then
75 See Barbera, supra note 62, at 2713-14 (noting that quarantines that were
undertaken in the past century primarily involved recent immigrants and ethnic mi-
norities).
76 See The Center for Law and the Public's Health at Georgetown and Johns
Hopkins Universities, The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act, Draft (Dec.
21, 2001) [hereinafter MSEHPA Draft] at
http://www.publichealthlaws.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA2.pdf.
A comparison of the cover pages of the two versions of "The Model State
Emergency Health Powers Act" is both instructive and deeply disturbing.
The October 23, 2001 version contains the following language immediately
under the act's title and the date: "Prepared by The Center for Law and the
Public's Health at Georgetown and Johns Hopkins Universities For the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention In collaboration with the: Na-
tional Governors Association, National Conference of State Legislatures,
Association of State and Territorial Health Officials, National Association
of City and County Health Officers, and National Association of Attorneys
General."
The cover page of the December 21, 2001 version (apparently the final
one) reads as follows after the title of the Act: "The Model State Emer-
gency health Powers Act: As of December 21, 2001. A Draft for Discus-
sion Prepared by: The Center for Law and the Public's Health at George-
town and Johns Hopkins Universities For the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention [CDC] To Assist: National Governors Association [NGA],
National Conference of State Legislatures [NCSL], Association of State and
Territorial Health Officials [ASTHO], and National Association of County
and City Health Officials [NACCHO].
The cover page also contains a footnote to the title of the Act which reads:
"Members of the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) also
provided input and suggestions to the drafters of the Model Act. The lan-
guage and content of this draft Model State Emergency Health Powers Act
do not represent the official policy, endorsement, or views of the Center for
Law and the Public's Health, the CDC, NGA, NCSL, ASTHO, NACCHO,
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Director of the CDC, Jeffrey Koplan, wrote me on December 28,
2001: "The draft model act does not represent any official or unoffi-
cial CDC position.,
77
Although the revised act is a modest improvement (some sugges-
tions were taken by the authors), all the fundamental problems remain.
Failure to comply with the orders of public health officials for exami-
nation or treatment is no longer a crime but results in isolation or
quarantine. Criminal penalties continue to apply for failure to follow
isolation or quarantine "rules" that will be written at a future time.
Physicians and other health care providers can still be required "to
assist" public health officials, but cooperation is now coerced as "a
condition of licensure" instead of a legal requirement with criminal
penalties for noncompliance. The quarantine provisions have been
improved, with a new requirement that quarantine or isolation be im-
posed by "the least restrictive means necessary" and stronger due-
process protection, including hearings and legal representation for
or NAAG, or other governmental or private agencies, departments, institu-
tions, or organizations which have provided funding or guidance to the Cen-
ter for Law and the Public's Health. This draft is prepared to facilitate and
encourage communication among the various interested parties and stake-
holders about the complex issues pertaining to the use of state emergency
health powers."
Assuming the second cover page is accurate, the first, which claims far
more support and authority for the model act than it actually had, is unpro-
fessional and misleading in the extreme. This may be acceptable behavior
for a lawyer-advocate, but is not acceptable from an academic or scholar.
Nonetheless, the authors continue to overstate the extent of support for their
product, writing in the summer of 2002, for example, that "16 states and the
District of Columbia already have enacted a version of the act (as of June
26, 2002, states enacting or expected shortly to enact legislation influenced
by the Model Act were Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Maine, Mary-
land, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oklahoma,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and Virginia)." Lawrence
Gostin et al. The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: Planning for
and Response to Bioterrorism and Naturally Occurring Infectious Diseases,
288 JAMA 622, 622 (2002). What some of these states actually did is
summarized in notes 85 and 86 infra.
The most supportive organization, the National Conference of State Legis-
latures, set forth its views in June 2002: "NCSL does not endorse or rec-
ommend passage of the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act. This
document [the Act] and the checklist questions are provided as a service to
legislators and their staff who are considering changes to state statutes re-
garding public health emergencies." LISA SPEISSEGGER & CHERYL RUNYON,
THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT: A CHECKLIST OF
ISSUES 1 (NCSL, Washington, D.C., 2002).




those actually quarantined. Nonetheless, on the basis of a written
directive by a public health official, a person can still be quarantined
for 15 days before a hearing must be held, and the hearing itself can
be for groups of quarantined persons rather than individuals.78 Noth-
ing in the revised act distinguishes between approved drugs and vac-
cines and investigational agents, even though the latter are the most
likely to be used, and even though state law cannot override federal
drug laws that govern their use and informed consent requirements.
79
Some of the revised quarantine provisions seem even more arbi-
trary. A major criticism of the original version of the act was the ex-
treme vagueness of its standard for quarantine, which invited the arbi-
trary use of force. According to the original version, reproduced
above, public health officials could order a person quarantined if they
were "uncertain... [whether a person who refuses to be examined or
tested has] been exposed to an infectious disease or otherwise poses a
danger to public health. 80 In the revised version the standard is made
even more vague. Quarantine can be ordered when the person's re-
fusal to be examined or tested "results in uncertainty regarding
whether he or she has been exposed to or is infected with a contagious
or possibly contagious disease or otherwise poses a danger to public
health." 81 This is no standard at all, and simply permits public health
authorities to quarantine anyone who refuses to be examined or
treated, for whatever reason, since all refusals will result in uncer-
tainty - if you were already certain, you wouldn't order the test. At
the hearing, if requested, it seems like the standard for continued
quarantine is that the individual would significantly jeopardize the
public health authority's ability "to prevent or limit the transmission
of a contagious or possibly contagious disease to others." 82 This stan-
dard also makes no sense because the public health focus, I think,
should be on the person's condition and on the determination of
whether the person poses a danger to others, not on the public health
authority's ability to function.
These vague standards are especially troublesome because the
act's incredible immunity provision remains unchanged. Thus, all
state public health officials and all private companies and persons
operating under their authority are granted immunity from liability for
their actions (except for gross negligence or willful misconduct), even
in the case of death or permanent injury. Out-of-state emergency
78 Id., sections 605(a) and (b) at pp. 28-29.
79 Supra notes 19 to 46 and accompanying text.
80 Supra note 53 and accompanying text.
81 See MSEHPA Draft, supra note 76, at 26 (emphasis supplied).
82 See MSEHPA Draft, supra note 76, at 30.
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health care providers have even greater protection; they are given im-
munity from liability for everything but manslaughter. In my opinion,
such immunity is something public health authorities should not want
(even though it may have superficial appeal), because it means that
they are not accountable for their actions, no matter how arbitrary.
The immunity provision thus serves only to undermine the public's
trust in public health authorities. Citizens are not soldiers, and should
never be treated against their will by their government. But if they
ever are, they should be fully compensated for injuries suffered as a
result.83
VII. A MODEL FOR DISASTER?
There is no chance that every, or even many, states will adopt the
suggested act as written, so if uniformity is seen as necessary or desir-
able, only a federal statute can provide it. Obviously, it is also much
more important what states like New York and California (large states
that are likely bioterror targets) do than what states like Montana,
Wyoming or Arkansas do. So far, only a few states, like Delaware,
Oklahoma, and South Carolina, have adopted the suggested act
wholesale. More typically states have ignored it, or like California,
have considered it and rejected it outright. Other states, like Minne-
sota, have modified their quarantine laws, but have updated them to
be consistent with contemporary medical ethics and constitutional
rights, rather than making them more arbitrary.
The drafters, nonetheless, continue to grossly overstate their sup-
port. In their August 7, 2002 JAMA article, for example, the act's
drafters state: "Legislative bills based on the MSEHPA have been
introduced in 34 states and the District of Columbia; 16 states and the
District of Columbia have enacted a version of the act (as of June 26,
2002, states enacting or expected shortly to enact legislation influ-
enced by the Model Act were Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mex-
ico, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and
83 See, e.g., George J. Annas, The Nuremberg Code in U.S. Courts: Ethics
Versus. Expediency, in THE NAZI DOCTORS AND NUREMBERG CODE 201, 212-19
(George J. Annas & Michael A. Grodin, eds., Oxford U. Press, 1992) (arguing that
U.S. policy on human experimentation places human rights and ethics behind national
security & expediency). A good example of how arbitrary power tends to be used in
emergencies is the use of potentially lethal gas by Russian commandos to "rescue"
hostages held by Chechen nationals in October 2002. See Steven Lee Myers, From
Anxiety, Fear and Hope, The Deadly Rescue in Moscow, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2002, at
Al (stating that the gas killed at least 118 of the hostages).
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Virginia). 84 This is the language of salespeople, not legal scholars.
It is incorrect to state that "16 states... have enacted a version of the
act;" it is justifiable, but misleading, to state that this group of states
has (or will) "enact legislation influenced by the Model Act." In fact,
of the list, the following states (and the District of Columbia) rejected
all or most of the language of the Act, and none of them adopted the
most controversial items regarding treatment and quarantine as pro-
posed: Georgia, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, South Da-
kota, Tennessee, Utah, and Virginia.85 In the cases of these bills, for
the drafters of the model act to take credit for them is a bit like the old
story of the rooster taking credit for the sun rising in the morning.
Some states, including Florida, Maine, Maryland, New Hampshire,
Hawaii, Minnesota and Arizona did adopt quarantine laws affected by
the model act, but none are substantially identical to it.86 Of their list,
84 See Gostin et al., supra note 76, at 622-23.
85 A detailed state-by-state comparison of the laws so far enacted is well
beyond the scope or purpose of this article, and would serve little purpose. It is also
difficult to generalize about this group of state statutes (except to say that they are all
substantially different from the model act). Nonetheless, a few examples illustrate the
range and content of these laws. Georgia provides in relevant part that the department
of health shall "promulgate appropriate rules and regulations" for vaccination and
isolation and quarantine "in the case of a public health emergency." S.B. 385, 146
th
Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2001) enacted May, 2002 and codified in GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 31-12-3 and 4; and § 38-3-51(i)(2)(Supp. 2002). New Mexico's entire act is
only two pages long and provides for a petition to the court in case a person refuses
voluntary treatment, detention or observation, and an evidentiary hearing based on
clear and convincing evidence. Moreover, "The provisions of this section do not
permit the forcible administration of medications." H.B. 195, 45 th Leg., 2d Sess.
(N.M. 2002) codified in N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-1-15(l.) (Michie Supp. 2002). South
Dakota passed two 2 page laws dealing with emergencies; no quarantine or treatment
provisions are included, but the Governor may "provide for the examination and safe
disposal of any dead body as may be reasonable and necessary to respond to the dis-
aster, emergency, or act of terrorism." H.B. 1303, 7 7th Legis. Assem., Reg. Sess.
(S.D. 2002) codified in S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 33-15-8 (8) (LexisNexis Supp.
2002). Missouri's act is mostly devoted to wiretapping and communications intercep-
tion, and various types of terrorism, issues not even addressed in the model act (the
only provision of the model act is disaster planning and temporary licensure). S.B.
712, 91st Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2002).
86 This group of laws is all over the place, ranging in anticipated coercive
actions from Florida to Minnesota. Florida is perhaps the most draconian of these
laws, providing that "If the individual [who refuses to be examined or treated] poses a
danger to the public health, the state health officer may subject the individual to quar-
antine. If there is no practical method to quarantine the individual, the state health
officer may use any means necessary to vaccinate or treat the individual. Any order
of the state health officer given to effectuate this paragraph shall be immediately
enforceable by a law enforcement officer." Florida S.B. 1262 (2002). New Hamp-
shire, the "live free or die" state, has provisions for treatment and quarantine, but
provides that "Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to require the medical ex-
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only Oklahoma and South Carolina can accurately be described as
having "enacted a version of the act," and in no case is it an identical
version.
Notably, under the new Minnesota law, even in a public health
emergency, "individuals have a fundamental right to refuse medical
treatment, testing, physical or mental examination, vaccination, par-
ticipation in experimental procedures and protocols, collection of
specimens, and preventive treatment programs., 87 The law further
requires a health care provider "where feasible" to "notify the individ-
ual of the right to refuse." 88 Of course there are extreme circum-
stances under which isolation or quarantine can be employed. But the
Minnesota legislature permits such measures only under very limited
conditions, the right to refuse all interventions continues in isolation
and quarantine, and family members are specifically given the right to
choose to enter the isolation or quarantine area to visit. Most of the
other provisions of the suggested act, including the immunity provi-
sions, were referred to the Minnesota commissioner of health who
was instructed to study them and report back to the legislature, after
having solicited public comment on any recommendations. 89  The
Minnesota legislature properly recognized that human rights and
health are not inherently conflicting goals that must be traded off
against each other. They are, as Jonathan Mann first articulated in the
context of the international HIV/AIDS epidemic, "inextricably
linked."9 °
The suggested act was drafted under extreme albeit self-imposed
time constraints in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 and the anthrax
amination, medical treatment, or immunization of a person who objects, and no
criminal penalties shall be imposed as a result." Moreover, should quarantine be
ordered, it shall be at the place of the individual's own choosing "unless the Commis-
sioner determines such place to be impractical or unlikely to adequately protect the
public health." 2002 NH H.B. 1478 (enacted May 17, 2002). Minnesota also, and
even more explicitly, protects an individual's right to refuse treatment: "Notwith-
standing laws, rules, or orders made or promulgated in response to a national security
emergency, peacetime emergency, or public health emergency, individuals have a
fundamental right to refuse medical treatment, testing, physical or mental examina-
tion, vaccination, participation in experimental procedures and protocols, collection of





90 Model act drafter Lawrence Gostin used to share this belief as well. See,
e.g., Jonathan M. Mann et al., Health and Human Rights, 1 HEALTH AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 6 (1994) (explaining collaboration among health and human rights programs).
Gostin & Mann, supra note 74.
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attacks when fear ruled reason. This is a predictable prescription for
disaster. Sensible public health and bioterrorism legislation must be
drafted in a calm atmosphere, in a transparent, public process. Per-
haps most importantly, as Ken Wing has noted, "statute drafting is a
technical and instrumental job - one that should follow, not precede
the more fundamental task of deciding what the statute ought to
say."9' Public health must ultimately rely not on force but on persua-
sion, and never on blind trust. Trust itself must be based on transpar-
ency, accountability, democracy and human rights.
There is plenty of time to draft and debate a 21st century federal
public health law that takes constitutional rights seriously, unites the
public with its medical caretakers, treats medicine and public health as
true partners, and moves us in the direction of global cooperation.
The revised act could be useful as a checklist for reviewing existing
law, but only if it is continuously subject to scrutiny and improve-
ment, and is rewritten to be consistent with federal statutory, regula-
tory and constitutional law.
VIII. FEDERAL (AND GLOBAL) PUBLIC HEALTH
A bioterrorist attack on the US is inherently a matter of national
security, making it a federal, not a state, matter. Epidemics arising
from outside the US are also matters of national concern. Public
health policy should be national, and the addition of national security
to national financing and interstate commerce, provides constitutional
authority for Congress to enact legislation giving the federal govern-
ment the leadership role in public health in the 21st century. To re-
91 Kenneth Wing, The Model Act: Is It the Best Way to Prepare for the Next
Public Health Emergency?, 19 NW. PuB. HEALTH 10 (2002). Epidemiologic models
for responding to a smallpox attack did not begin to appear in the literature until al-
most a year after the model act was drafted. Controversy continues about which
model is most likely to mirror reality, and all are based on assumptions about the
number of people each person with smallpox is likely to affect. As one commentator
put it, "Without appropriate data, models cannot indicate whether we should target
contacts for quarantine or vaccination when those contacts have been made in house-
holds, schools, workplaces, at public events, or under other circumstances." Jim
Koopman, Controlling Smallpox, 298 SCIENCE 1342, 1343 (2002). See also M.
Elizabeth Halloran et al., Containing Bioterrorist Smallpox, 298 SCIENCE 1428
(2002). Of course, developing an effective legal strategy is dependent upon reason-
able epidemiology, and without it legal plans are likely to be unresponsive or irrele-
vant to real world epidemics - whether naturally-occurring or terrorist-created.
The authors are currently working on yet another "model" public health act under the
Turning Point Project for the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. Speissegger &
Runyon, supra note 76. The credibility of their new act could, of course, be severely
undermined by their zealous attempts to sell this one.
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spond effectively to bioterrorism and epidemics, it is imperative that
the federal government develop a national plan that individual states
can help implement, and that the federal government supply the states
with the badly needed financial and other resources to improve public
health infrastructure, training, and coordination.
At the outset of the 21st century, bioterrorism, although only one
threat to public health, can be the catalyst to effectively federalize and
integrate much of what is now uncoordinated and piecemeal state and
local public health programs. This should include a renewed effort for
national health insurance, national licensure for physicians, nurses,
and allied health professionals, and national patient safety standards.92
Federal public health leadership will also encourage us to look out-
ward, and to recognize that prevention of future bioterrorist attacks
and even ordinary epidemics will require international cooperation.93
It is time to not only federalize public health, but to globalize it as
well.
The sudden appearance of SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syn-
drome) on the world stage in February 2003 illustrates all of these
points. It is a useful illustration because SARS is like a 19th century
epidemic in that there is no diagnostic test, no effective treatment, and
no vaccine. Although it is far too early in this new viral epidemic to
predict its outcome, a few observations can be made. First, SARS is a
global epidemic. It began in China, and quickly spread throughout
Asia and to North America, often by infected persons traveling by
air.94 No individual country, let alone a state within a country can
effectively deal with a global epidemic alone. The World Health Or-
ganization quickly (and appropriately) took the lead in responding to
92 See George J. Annas, Bioterrorism, Public Health, and Human Rights,
21HEALTH AFFAIRS 94, 96 (2002) (arguing for a more federalized and global public
health system, protection of basic human and constitutional rights, and modernization
of public health system).
93 Although I have argued in this piece that modem public health will from
now on be considered primarily a federal rather than a state responsibility, it would be
even better if it were treated as a global issue, since epidemic diseases know no geo-
graphic boundaries and effective public health measures demand international action.
See generally, LAURIE GARRETT, BETRAYAL OF TRUST: THE COLLAPSE OF GLOBAL
PUBLIC HEALTH (Hyperion, 2000) (discussing the global impact of disease); see gen-
erally INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, EMERGING INFECTIONS: MICROBIAL THREATS TO
HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES (Joshua Lederberg et al. eds., 1992) (noting the need
for a "comprehensive global infectious disease surveillance system"); Lauren Z.
Asher, Confronting Disease in a Global Arena, 9 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMPARATIVE
L. 135 (2001) (noting the importance of international health regulations).
94 Julie Louise Gerberding, Faster ... but Fast Enough? Responding to the
Epidemic of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2030 (2003).
[Vol. 13:33
BLINDED BY BIOTERRORISM
the epidemic by, among other things, initiating travel advisories.
95
Second, sick people and their health care providers almost universally
acted appropriately. Those who were diagnosed with SARS, for ex-
ample, agreed to voluntary treatment and isolation, and physicians and
nuo, did not try to avoid their duties (even though they were the
individuals who turned out to be most at risk to contract SARS). As
two U.S. public health experts put it, "praise is due to the hundreds of
health care workers throughout the world who come to work every
day to assist patients with SARS despite some risks to their own
health. 96 Public health and medicine have been partners, not ene-
mies, in responding to SARS.
Third, mass involuntary quarantine is generally unnecessary and
almost always ineffective because it leads to mistrust of the govern-
ment. In one three day period, for example, after a rumor that Beijing
itself might be quarantined or put under martial law, almost a quarter
of a million migrant workers fled to rural Henan province; and in a
small rural town, Chagugang, thousands rioted and destroyed a build-
ing that was being finished to quarantine SARS patients. 97 Mistrust of
the Chinese government generally made it more difficult for China to
deal with its epidemic effectively.98 A more effective strategy, em-
ployed in every affected democratic country, was to ask those people
possibly infected with SARS to voluntarily stay at home for ten days
and monitor their temperatures. In the United States, this method was
used almost exclusively, with the exception of two tourists in New
York City, and one in Dallas, who were quarantined involuntarily in
hospitals because they had no home to stay in.99 No governor de-
clared a state of emergency - so no emergency public health law was
95 Margot Cohen, Gautam Naik & Matt Pottinger, Inside the WHO as it
Mobilized for War on SARS, WALL ST. J., May 2, 2003, at Al; Matt Pottinger, Elena
Cherney, Gautam Naik & Michael Waldholz, How Global Effort Found SARS Virus
in Matter of Weeks, WALL ST. J., April 16, 2003, at Al; Lawrence K. Altman, W.HO.
Expected to Gain Broader Powers, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2003, at A10.
96 Richard P. Wenzel & Michael B. Edmond, Managing SARS amidst Uncer-
tainty, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1947, 1948 (2003).
97 Charles Hutzler, China Reverts to Top-Down Rule with Heavy Hand to
Fight SARS, WALL ST. J., May 8, 2003, at A8; Leslie Chang & Peter Wonacott, SARS
Measures in China Add to Air of Panic, WALL ST. J., April 25, 2003, at B7; Erik
Eckholm, SARS is the Spark for a Riot in China, N.Y. TIMES, April 29, 2003, at Al.
98 John Pomfret, A Mistrust of Government Undercuts China's Effort, WASH.
POST, April 29, 2003, at Al. A small authoritarian state, like Singapore, ruthlessly
(and effectively) enforced quarantines. Wayne Harold, In Singapore, 1970's Law
Becomes Weapon Against SARS, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2003, at D5.
99 Lawrence K. Altman, Public Health Fears Cause Officials to Detain For-
eign Tourist, N.Y. TIMES, April 28, 2003, at A15, and Marci Layton, N.Y.C. Health
Dept. (personal communication, June 18, 2003).
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triggered. Finally, response to major epidemics must be federal. The
only legal change in the United States in response to SARS was made
by the federal government, and applies primarily to individuals arriv-
ing to the United States from areas in which SARS is present. SARS
was added to the list of federal "quarantinable communicable dis-
eases" on April 4, 2003.00
Similar lessons about the appropriate level of government for pub-
lic health planning for bioterrorism can be drawn from the prepara-
tions for a smallpox attack. The need for trust in public officials is
also illustrated, since in this case (like the case of offering anthrax
vaccine to those potentially exposed to anthrax) it seems to be primar-
ily distrust of government that led the vast majority of those eligible
for smallpox vaccination to refuse it. No one can quantify the risk of a
smallpox bioterrorism attack; it is very low, but its potential for harm
is so great should it happen that it cannot be ignored by govern-
ment. 01 All major discussions and planning for such an attack have
been done at the federal level, especially at the CDC.0 2 Stockpiles of
existing smallpox vaccine have been created by the federal govern-
ment, tests to dilute the vaccine have been sponsored by the federal
government, and the development of new smallpox vaccines is being
financed by the federal government.103 All of the existing and pro-
posed supply of smallpox vaccine will be owned and controlled by the
federal government. 04 Not only will the individual states have no say
as to whether or not smallpox vaccine will be available to them, deci-
sions about whom the vaccine will be available to (such as military
personnel, emergency department nurses, physicians and other em-
ployees, first responders), etc., will be made by federal officials, not
by governors or other state officials. The most difficult decision,
1oo Executive Order 13295, Revised List of Quarantinable Communicable
Diseases, April 4, 2003. See also, DHHS, Control of Communicable Diseases, 68
FED. REG. 17559 (April 10, 2003).
101 See, e.g., Gina Kolata, A Nation Challenged: Vaccinations; With Vaccine
Available, Smallpox Debate Shifts, N.Y. TIMES, March 30, 2002, at A8 (stating poten-
tial harm of smallpox attack but also stating that the potential for such an attack is
low).
102 E.g., CDC Smallpox Response Plan and Guidelines, Draft 3.0 (Sept. 21,
2002), at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/repsonse-plan/index.asp. See also,
e.g., supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text for FDA regulation of drugs and vac-
cines related to a bioterrorist attack.
103 Robert Pear, Frozen Smallpox Vaccine is Still Potent, Officials Say, N.Y.
TIMES, March 30, 2002, at A8.
104 Lawrence Altman, William Broad & Denise Grady, White House Debate
on Smallpox Slows Plan for Wide Vaccination, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2002, at 10.
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whether to make smallpox vaccine available to members of the public
prior to an attack, will be made by the president.
10 5
Two points about smallpox preparation merit emphasis: first, this
is a federal public health activity;' 0 6 and second, smallpox vaccination
is likely to remain an entirely voluntary decision. Troops slated to go
to Iraq were involuntarily vaccinated, but even this military exception
was put in place only after the vaccine itself was properly licensed by
the FDA, and screening was performed so that military personnel at
risk of an adverse reaction were excluded.10 7 The military smallpox
vaccination program went essentially as planned, although more than
'05 Id. See also Marilyn Chase and Greg Hitt, Ugly Side Effects of Smallpox
Vaccine Color Terror Plans, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 2002, at Al (noting health and
liability risks associated with the vaccine). Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge
has also been quoted as saying, "The president on down-everyone-recognizes in this
life-and-death decision that the president has to make, there will be some families that
endure losses and others that endure permanent injury. There has to be some way to
compensate them." Id. See also The Homeland Security Act, which provides that all
lawsuits involving the smallpox vaccine must be filed against the federal government.
H.R. 5710, 107th Cong. § 304(c)(p)(2)(B) (2002).
106 The new Homeland Security Act, H.R. 5710, 107th Cong. § 304(c)(p)(l)-
(2)(A)(i), (c)(p)(7)(B)-(C) (2002), made special provisions for the administration of
"any substance used to prevent or treat smallpox" to civilians. Specifically, if the
Secretary of Health and Human Services issues a declaration "concluding that an
actual or potential bioterrorist incident or other actual or potential public health emer-
gency makes advisable the administration" [of smallpox vaccine or treatment] a "cov-
ered person shall be deemed to be an employee of the Public Health Service with
respect to liability arising out of administration of a covered countermeasure against
smallpox." Covered person is defined to mean not only the "qualified person" who
administers the drug or vaccine, but also the manufacturer, the health care entity
under whose auspices the smallpox vaccine or treatment is administered, and any
"official, agent or employee" of the manufacturer, health care entity, or person admin-
istering the treatment or vaccine. A "qualified person" (i.e., the one administering the
vaccine or treatment) "means a licensed health professional or other individual who is
authorized to administer such countermeasure under the law of the State in which the
countermeasure was administered." All lawsuits for injury would have to be filed
against the U.S. (Sec. 304)
Of course what this means for a state that adopts the provisions of the "model act" is
that recovery for negligence of the individuals administering smallpox vaccine and
treatment will be available (albeit, only by suing the federal government, as was the
case in the 1976 swine flu vaccination program). It also means, however, that the
qualifications of the people administering the treatment will be determined by state
law; under the model act, whoever the public health authority designates to fill the
vaccinator and/or treatment role. Congress could, of course, make different rules for
agents other than those designed for smallpox, and could amend these rules as well.
107 Altman et al., supra note 98, and Denise Grady, Pentagon Faces Difficul-
ties in Smallpox Shots for Troops, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2002, at A16. See also Law-
rence K. Altman & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Smallpox Vaccine Backed for Public, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 5, 2002, at Al (noting that when the vaccine is publicly available it will
be offered on an optional basis).
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100 women who were pregnant were vaccinated who should have
been excluded. 10 8 The plan to vaccinate up to 500,000 health care
workers who would be responsible to vaccinate the public in the event
of a smallpox attack, however, faltered badly, and by June, 2003 was
officially "paused."' 1 9 Many explanations have been provided for a
response rate of less than 10% of eligible physicians and nurses. The
most reasonable one seems to be that both the risks and the benefits of
the smallpox vaccine were exaggerated, and physicians and nurses
concluded (reasonably I think) that notwithstanding the government's
position, the risk of the vaccine was not worth the benefit." 10
After the conclusion of the Iraq War, the public relations disaster
of recommending that all Americans get a supply of duct tape and
plastic sheeting, and the growing public cynicism with repeated "or-
ange alerts," few health care workers could take the prospect of a
smallpox attack seriously."' Thus, even though the risk of the vac-
cine was relatively low, the benefits appeared to be even lower. In this
regard, trust in what the government said was very low - I think be-
cause if the government has information about a country or group that
has weaponized smallpox, it has an obligation to share this informa-
tion with the American public. It is terrorists who would want to keep
this information a secret, not the potential targets of an attack. Thus
the federal government's failure to make their intelligence available to
the public led, I think, to the reasonable conclusion that the govern-
ment actually possessed no credible information - and could even
have been using the smallpox scare to build support for the Iraq
108 Donald McNeil, 2 Programs to Vaccinate for Smallpox are 'Paused,' N.Y.
TIMES, June 19, 2003 at Al 3; Denise Grady, Despite Warnings, Pregnant Women Got
Smallpox Vaccine, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2003 at A18.
109 Id., and Richard W. Stevenson & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Bush Lays Out
Plan on Smallpox Shots; Military is First, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2002, at IA. See
also, Jon Cohen & Martin Enserink, Rough-and-Tumble Behind Bush's Smallpox
Policy, 298 SCIENCE 2312 (2002), and Ceci Connolly, Panel Urges Caution on
Smallpox Innoculation, Washington Post, June 20, 2003, at A9.
110 See generally George J. Annas, Smallpox Vaccine: Not Worth the Risk,
HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, March-April 2003, at 6 (arguing that the federal govern-
ment's statement that "there is not a zero risk of a smallpox attack" was "useless
information" and "counterproductive" without disclosing the basis of the information
because "[s]ecrecy makes sense only for the attacker, not the defenders."); Joan Ste-
phenson, Smallpox Vaccine Program Launched Amid Concerns Raised by Expert
Panel, Unions, 289 JAMA 685 (2003).
" 1 Id. See William J. Broad, Bush Signals He Thinks Possibility of Smallpox
Attack is Rising, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2002 at A10; Judith Miller, C.I.A. Hunts Iraq
Tie to Soviet Smallpox, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2002, at A20; Anita Manning, How
Prepared are we Against Smallpox?, USA TODAY, March 6, 2003, at 1D.
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War.1 12 Nonetheless, the conclusions regarding federal authority over
public health policy related to bioterrorism, support for voluntary pub-
lic health programs, and the necessity of public trust for effective pub-
lic health interventions are all illustrated by our experience to date
with smallpox vaccination. Reducing the risk of a smallpox attack will
also require global action. Specifically, the US should take a leader-
ship role in strengthening international treaties to prevent the manu-
facture, storage, and use of biological toxins."
3
IX. CONCLUSION
Our new kind of war against bioterrorism should be built on a
goal of protecting liberty, not depriving Americans of it. As the
American Civil Liberties Union has put it after 9/11, we should keep
America "safe and free" (although I'd reverse the order). There is a
knee jerk tendency in times of war and national emergencies to re-
strict civil liberties as the most effective way to counteract the threat.
But history has taught us that such restrictions are almost always use-
less and often counterproductive, and we usually wind up with deep
regrets for our action. 1 4 The tendency to return to the days before
liberty and informed consent were taken seriously was evident both in
the Gulf War and in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. In neither in-
stance did these responses help make Americans safer or more secure,
and in both they threatened the very liberties that make our country
worth protecting.
The planned use of arbitrary force by Americans against Ameri-
cans is un-American, even if done in the name of public health. No
American physician should be forced to do anything to a patient that
the physician does not believe is in the patient's best interests, and
even then only with the patient's consent. No American soldier
should be forced to take experimental drugs and vaccines; and no
American citizen should be forced to take any drug or vaccine, or to
be quarantined against their will, when any other less restrictive alter-
112 E.g., Marie McCullough & Marian Uhlman, National Campaign Against
Smallpox Falters, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, April 3, 2003 at BI; Martin Ensherink,
Smallpox Vaccination Campaign in the Doldrums, 300 SCIENCE 880 (2003).
113 See, e.g., Bruce Alberts & Robert M. May, Scientist Support for Biological
Weapons Control, 298 SCIENCE 1135 (2002).
114 The interment of Japanese Americans during World War II is only the
most spectacular of these "emergency" civil rights violations - not only did it unfairly
and unjustly impact on the Japanese involved, but its legacy made it impossible to
engage in any sort of rational airport screening in the wake of 9/11. But see, Eric
Lichtblau, Bush Issues Racial Profiling Ban but Exempts Security Inquiries, N.Y.
TIMEs, June 18, 2003 at IA.
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native is available. America is strong because its people are free, and
to be both moral and effective public planning for war and public
health emergencies must be based on respecting freedom and trusting
our fellow citizens. Rather than adopt the tactics of repressive totali-
tarian regimes, the United States should lead the world in proclaiming
a new, global public health, based on transparency, trust, and science,
and most importantly, based on respect for human rights.
